The 21st Century Phenomenon




American-led NATO-ISAF force in Afghanistan failed to achieve the most strategic objectives in order to change the course of the war and enable a stable Afghan regime to run the country during and after Western allies withdrawal from Afghanistan scheduled to begin just one month ahead – on 07/01/2011 (see – Petraeus W Plan).

A. To seal the common Pakistani-Afghan border in order to deny a safe haven for the Taliban in Afghanistan. The Jalaluddin Haqqani’s network is still coordinated and operated from Pakistan’s North Waziristan region and the Supreme Council of the Taliban, the Taliban Shura, is still located in Quetta, the capital of Pakistan’s province of Baluchistan. In most of the attacks in Eastern Pakistan in the last Taliban’s Spring-Offensive supplies, training, preparations and many of the warriors themselves came from Pakistan. Basically there is no substantial change on this matter since the beginning of the war in 11/2001. The common border and the Pakistani attitude toward Afghanistan was always the key issue of success or failure in Afghanistan.

B. In an attempt to repeat the success with the Awakening Councils in Iraq and to crumb the Taliban from within the American army made an effort to persuade all kinds of tribal elders, sheikhs, strong men and others to switch side from pro Taliban insurgency to pro-Government activity promising money, training, weapons and economic support. Iraq was never a religion-run state, it was initially a monarchy and since 1958 was run by Arab socialists from all kinds who opposed firmly religious intervention in state affairs.  When Al Qaeda came to relative secular Iraq in 2003 they tried to impose strict version of Islam on Iraqis arousing dispute and tension. Eventually many Iraqis were trapped between American attempt to impose democracy and Al Qaeda attempt to impose strict Islam. In Afghanistan the Taliban are locals practicing the same Islam and the same Afghan way of life.  Eventually the American program success’ in Afghanistan  is very limited and failed to affect the hard core of the main insurgency groups in Afghanistan.

C. The best solution for the Western allies in Afghanistan and for Hamid Karzai’s regime is to integrate the Taliban into the Afghan regime in a sort of a power sharing deal. But since NATO-ISAF is already committed to a time table to withdraw from the country and is showing more interest in leaving Afghanistan then in overpowering the Taliban, despite keen efforts of the Afghani president Hamid Karzai to negotiate a power sharing deal with the Taliban conglomerate (see – Peace Rumors 02.01.11). Taliban’s firm position is  that they are ready to talk peace only after the last US led NATO-ISAF coalition soldiers will leave the country, way too late for Hamid Karzai’s regime. The only serious talks were with the imposter Mullah Akhtar Muhammad Mansour (see – The Impostor). For the moment USA failed to build a political infrastructure for Afghanistan a day after their withdrawal from the country.

Eventually USA in Afghanistan failed in its three key objects; to seal the border with Pakistan and to create an common understanding with Pakistan on the future of Afghanistan; to dismantle the insurgency alliance from within and/or to integrate the Taliban conglomerate into the Afghan regime in a sort of a sharing power deal. In the background – NATO lost its political will and determination to go on with the war.  Without achieving at least one of those three objectives and giving the political background any military success is short living and the Taliban, as well as Washington, know it too.
* Related topics ;  



Read more ;
Please Share...Share on Facebook
Tweet about this on Twitter